Daniel Waterman accused Leigha Mumby before his death, but a judge barred his statements and prosecutors rebuilt their case around physical evidence.
BUNNELL, Fla. — The man who survived a violent Interstate 95 crash long enough to tell investigators what he believed had happened was absent from the evidence a Florida jury heard when it convicted his girlfriend of causing his death.
That evidentiary divide was one of the defining features of the prosecution of Leigha Catherine Marie Mumby, 25. Daniel Waterman woke from a coma in 2025 and told a Florida Highway Patrol investigator that Mumby had been driving recklessly during an argument and had intentionally caused their Honda Passport to leave the highway. By the time Mumby went to trial in October 2026, Waterman was dead, and Circuit Judge Dawn Nichols had ruled that jurors could not hear his account. Prosecutors nevertheless secured guilty verdicts for vehicular homicide and reckless driving causing serious bodily injury after presenting vehicle data, crash reconstruction testimony and evidence about the circumstances leading up to the wreck.
The six-person jury returned its verdict Oct. 14 after about 71 minutes of deliberations. The decision demonstrated how far the case had shifted from its early public narrative. News reports and the original criminal complaint had focused heavily on Waterman’s account, including his assertion that Mumby made a threatening remark shortly before the crash. But once the judge excluded his statements as hearsay, the prosecution had to answer a different question: Could the state prove criminally reckless driving beyond a reasonable doubt without relying on the one passenger who had been inside the vehicle?
Waterman’s statement had emerged under extraordinary circumstances. He was critically injured when Mumby’s white 2019 Honda Passport went off northbound Interstate 95 near mile marker 291 in Flagler County on Feb. 9, 2025, and struck trees. He suffered a broken neck and paralysis and spent months in serious condition. When investigators interviewed him May 15, he was unable to communicate normally. Reports citing his family and investigative records said he used a letter board and sounds to convey answers. He said the couple had argued, described Mumby’s driving as reckless and accused her of deliberately causing the crash.
According to the complaint, Waterman told investigators that Mumby had slowed to about 50 mph and that he tried to get out before the SUV accelerated to roughly 80 or 90 mph. He also said the final words he remembered Mumby saying were, “I don’t care what happens, you’ll get what you deserve.” That statement became a prominent part of early reporting on the case. It was not, however, part of the evidence the jury used to convict her. Before trial, Assistant State Attorney Melissa Clark acknowledged that she lacked a legal basis to introduce Waterman’s statements over the defense’s objection, and Nichols ruled them inadmissible.
The ruling also helped reshape the charges. Mumby had initially faced aggravated battery with a deadly weapon along with reckless driving causing serious bodily injury. The aggravated-battery count carried a more direct allegation of intentional conduct. Prosecutors dropped it before trial after the evidentiary ruling. The remaining vehicular-homicide charge required proof of reckless operation of a vehicle likely to cause death or great bodily harm, not proof that Mumby had formed a deliberate plan to kill Waterman. That distinction allowed prosecutors to move away from his allegation of an intentional crash and instead make the Honda’s recorded movements the center of the trial.
The SUV’s data provided the state with a second way to tell the story of the final seconds. Trial reporting said the Honda was moving at about 93 to 95 mph shortly before it left the interstate. Evidence described at trial included a sharp steering input while the vehicle was traveling about 94 mph. Prosecutors argued that Mumby had been driving aggressively during an emotionally charged dispute and that the combination of extreme speed and abrupt steering showed a reckless disregard for safety. The State Attorney’s Office said she had been driving at more than 100 mph during the period leading up to the collision.
The defense tried to use the technical evidence to create reasonable doubt rather than dispute that the crash was catastrophic. Attorney Reid Hart argued that something unforeseen happened in the vehicle and that Mumby’s later steering response suggested an attempt to avoid the crash. Reporting from the trial described evidence of a second steering movement after the initial turn, which the defense characterized as corrective action. Hart also argued that Mumby had no reason to intentionally expose herself, Waterman or the unborn child she had learned that morning she was carrying to a potentially fatal collision.
The argument mattered because prosecutors had to be careful not to turn excluded statements into an indirect theory of intent. Instead, Clark focused on how Mumby was driving. She told jurors that Mumby was traveling at extreme speeds and behaving aggressively behind the wheel. Prosecutors also introduced evidence that the couple had been arguing. Mumby had learned she was pregnant earlier that day, and testimony and reporting indicated there was tension involving messages Waterman had received from another woman. The state presented those circumstances as context for her driving but relied on the manner of operation itself to satisfy the criminal standard.
Waterman died Oct. 8, 2025, about eight months after the crash, after developing pneumonia. His death prompted prosecutors to add the vehicular-homicide charge. He was 22. The State Attorney’s Office said he had suffered a broken neck and paralysis from the neck down. His death also meant he could never appear in court to testify and be cross-examined, a problem that became central to the later fight over whether his statements to investigators could be introduced. Nichols’ exclusion of those statements reflected the ordinary evidentiary and constitutional limits that apply when an out-of-court accusation cannot be tested through cross-examination.
That left jurors with a case in which the most publicly familiar allegation was legally invisible. They did not need to decide whether Waterman’s description was truthful, mistaken or incomplete because they were not permitted to consider it. Instead, they were asked to determine whether the state’s admissible evidence established that Mumby drove recklessly and whether that conduct caused Waterman’s fatal injuries. After a short deliberation, the jury concluded that it did. Mumby cried after the verdict was read, according to courtroom reports, and Nichols revoked her bond before she was led from court in custody.
The verdict also illustrates the difference between a criminal case as it is discussed publicly and the version that reaches a jury. Outside the courtroom, readers knew of Waterman’s accusation and the words he said Mumby used. Inside it, jurors received a more restricted record shaped by evidentiary rulings. The state succeeded without the statement by turning to speed calculations, steering movements, witness testimony and the chronology preceding the crash. The defense was likewise able to argue from the physical evidence that the collision was unintended. The guilty verdict showed that jurors found the state’s recklessness theory sufficient even without the most dramatic evidence associated with the case.
Currently, Mumby awaits punishment rather than a determination of guilt. FlaglerLive reported that Nichols scheduled sentencing for Dec. 2 and that the two convictions expose Mumby to as much as 20 years in prison. She remains in custody following the revocation of her bond. Whatever sentence the judge imposes, the case will remain notable for the evidence jurors did not hear: Waterman’s account drove the investigation and public attention, but the prosecution ultimately won by proving its case without placing his accusation before them.
Author note: Last updated Nov. 20, 2026.